


















CDA AS DIALECTICAL REASONING: 
CRITIQUE, EXPLANATION AND 
ACTION1
Norman FAIRCLOUGH2
Abstract: In this chapter, I summarize how my approach to CDA has changed 
over 30 years, and then present the most recent version of it: CDA as ‘dialectical 
reasoning’. This emphasizes the relationship between critique, explanation and 
action. I discuss how this view of CDA might support political action to change 
social life for the better, referring to the ‘Kilburn Manifesto’ for transcending neo-
liberalism. The focus upon dialectical reasoning and political action differentiates 
this chapter from one in an earlier Routledge Handbook (FAIRCLOUGH, 2012). 
Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis; dialectical reasoning; Killburn Manifesto.
Introduction
CDA is a form of critical social analysis. Critical social analysis shows how 
forms of social life can damage people unnecessarily, but also how they can be 
changed. CDA’s contribution is elucidating how discourse is related to other social 
elements (power, ideologies, institutions etc.) and offering critique of discourse 
as a way into wider critique of social reality. But the objective is not just critique, 
it is change ‘for the better’. Academic critique alone cannot change reality, but it 
can contribute to political action for change by increasing understanding of exist-
ing reality and its problems and possibilities. Better understanding requires better 
explanations. CDA offers better explanatory understanding of relations between 
discourse and other components of social life. 
1 The editors of Policromias— Revista de Estudos do Discurso, Imagem e Somthanks Mister Norman Fairclough by sending 
us this text. We think that this text, presented in this journal in Portuguese for the first time, is a successful manner to 
carry the Critical Discourse Analysis (and the discourse studies, in general) to the Brazilian academic public.



















CDA combines critiqueof discourse and explanation of how discourse figures 
in existing social reality as a basis for action to change reality. This in summary 
form is what I mean by ‘dialectical reasoning’: a way of reasoning from critique 
of discourse to what should be done to change existing reality, by way of explana-
tion of relations between discourse and other components of reality. For example: 
critique of the discourse of modern universities, and explanation of how it figures 
within the ‘marketisation’ of universities, as a basis for action to change them. If 
universities represent students as ‘consumers’ (creating a problematic or ‘false’ 
analogy between the two), and this can be explained as part of a strategy to priva-
tise universities, there is arguably something amiss which should be changed (Fair-
clough 1993). This relation between critique, explanation and (political) action 
is the essence of CDA. Though CDA is not itself action, it is a step towards it, 
identifying and sometimes advocating lines of action. We cannot move from cri-
tique towards action except via explanation: without explanatory understanding 
of social reality, including causal and dialectical relations (I explain ‘dialectical 
relations’ below) between discourse and other elements of social life, we cannot 
know what needs to be changed, what can be changed, and how. Explanation is of 
particular importance in this approach to CDA, and other key features of the ap-
proach depend upon it. The focus is not just on power in discourse but also power 
behind discourse, not just on critique of manipulation but also critique of ideology, 
not just on particular aspects of existing social reality (e.g. representations of mi-
grants in the press) but also its capitalist character and how that impacts upon all 
its aspects (Fairclough 1989, 2014). 
Social reality is mediated by ideas and discourse: there are social entities 
(people, events, practices, institutions), and there are beliefs/ideas about and rep-
resentations of them, and analysis needs to encompass both and the relations 
between them. These relations are both cognitive and causal: both matters of rep-
resentation-and-interpretation and matters of cause-and-effect, both epistemologi-
cal relations which are open to critique, and ontological relations which require 
explanation (Bhaskar 1989: 101-2). Discourse is meaningful, but also a cause of and 
an effect of other social (and material) elements. One consequence is that objects 
of critical social analysis are simultaneously material and semiotic (discoursal), 
and analysis needs to focus upon (dialectical) relations between the two (Jessop 
2004). A second consequence is that critical social analysis is ‘trans-disciplinary’, 
it brings together disciplines whose concerns are material facets of social realities, 
and semiotic/discoursal facets. CDA itself does not provide analyses of capital-
ism, neoliberalism, politics, media etc. which it needs for explanation but collabo-
rates with other disciplines and theories, such as media or organization studies, 
or ‘cultural political economy’ (Jessop 2004, Fairclough 2010: 453-526),or ‘critical 



















A third consequence is that critical social analysis and CDA are both nor-
mative and explanatory critique: critique on the basis of norms or values, and cri-
tique on the basis of causal and dialectical relations. CDA begins with normative 
critique of discourse (simply ‘critique’ above), assessing it against norms (e.g. speak 
the truth, speak sincerely, speak justly), then moves via explanation of normatively 
problematic discourse to explanatory critique of features of social reality which lead 
to such discourse, and towards action - features of reality which have such effects 
need changing. Some forms of CDA are largely normative, but this is not enough 
to change reality: normative critique of people’s language and practices as, for 
example, racist needs to be combined with explanatory critique of aspects of social 
reality as producing such racism and needing to be changed. 
An approach to CDA
There have been three main versions of my approach, which has changed 
over time largely in response to social changes. The first, oriented to the post-
WorldWar2 social settlement, centred upon critique of ideological discourse as 
part of a concern with the reproduction of the existing social order (Fairclough 
1989). The second, corresponding to the shift to neoliberalism from the 1970s, 
centred upon critique of discourse as part of social change, especially part of 
attempts to impose ‘top-down’ neoliberal restructuring (Fairclough 1992). The 
third, corresponding to the 2007+ financial and economic crisis, centres upon cri-
tique of deliberative discourse as part of a wider concern with struggles over strat-
egies to overcome the crisis (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). The emphasis shifts 
between versions, but in a cumulative way that incorporates earlier concerns into 
new syntheses. For example, critique of ideology remains important throughout. 
Fairclough (2014) gives a detailed account of these changes and a critical compari-
son with other approaches. 
Fairclough (1989), the main formulation of the first version, is a radical 
view of CDA. It emphasises power behind discourse as well as in discourse - how 
people with power shape the ‘order of discourse’ and the social order, as well as 
controlling specific interactions like interviews. It correspondingly emphasises 
ideology rather than just persuasion and manipulation. It views discourse as a 
stake in, as well as a site of, social struggle including class struggle. It aims to raise 
consciousness of how language contributes to the domination of some people by 
others, as a step towards social emancipation. The 2007+ crisis indicates a con-
tinuing need for radical change. As the huge gap between rich and poor has con-



















fundamental social and political changes can reverse this and other damaging 
tendencies. If CDA wants to contribute, it needs to be radical.
The core of the first version is critique of ideology. Let’s take an example. 
Current debates about overcoming the crisis are often about return to eco-
nomic ‘growth’, and it is generally just taken for granted that ‘growth’ is nec-
essary, though this is not true for all economies. It is capitalist economies that 
require continuous growth, because that is the nature of ‘capital’, and failure 
to grow adequately is regarded as a crisis. Moreover it is not just growth that 
is necessary, so also is the discursive assumption that it is: the need for growth 
must be beyond question, mere common sense. Yet the real reason why growth 
is necessary for capitalism is difficult to legitimize in societies which claim to 
be democratic – why should those who already have more than enough always 
require more? Where reasons are given, they tend to be ‘rationalizations’, spu-
rious ‘reasons’ that are nevertheless more persuasive. Sometimes these take a 
proverbial form: ‘a rising tide raises all boats’. ‘Trickle-down’ economics claims 
that entrepreneurs should be richly rewarded for producing growth because it 
benefits us all, but this is arguably a rationalization, as this is not really why 
businesses are driven to continuously increase their turnover and profits (Fair-
clough & Fairclough 2012). A focus on ideology goes with a focus on explana-
tion: ideology critique is a form of explanatory critique which explains why 
features of discourse which are open to normative critique are nevertheless 
necessary for maintaining the social order. It also goes with a focus on critique 
of power behind discourse and of capitalism. Approaches to CDA which lack 
these focuses may talk about ideologies, but they cannot do ideology critique. 
The second version of my approach (Fairclough 1992) focused upon critique 
of discourse as a part of top-down social change in the implementation of neolib-
eral capitalism. An example is the ‘marketisation’ of universities as part of a general 
push to restructure public services on a market model. This was partly a discursive 
process: marketising universities meant making their discourse more like that of 
private corporations, and wider changes in structure, management and practices 
first appeared in new representations of the nature and activities of universities. 
This included ideological change in common sense assumptions, e.g. students are 
consumers, universities are businesses in competition. 
Such changes in discourse included changes in discourses (ways of repre-
senting reality), genres (ways of interacting discursively) and styles (ways of being, 



















versity’. These were evident in a variety of spoken and written texts (e.g. policy 
documents, publicity materials for recruiting students, management meetings). 
Over time the order of discourse changed - the configuration of discourses, genres 
and styles which defines the discursive character and potential of universities 
- as part of a general shift in their structure, management and practices. There 
were changes inintertextuality and more specificallyinterdiscursivity: different dis-
courses, different genres and different styles came to be combined in new ways, 
producing hybrid articulations of academic and market discourse (Fairclough 
1993). All versions of this approach to CDA are ‘textually-oriented’ (Fairclough 
1992): discourse analysis includes detailed analysis of texts, both linguistic 
(grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, genre) analysis, and interdiscursive analysis 
of hybrid articulations. Dynamically and historically, such hybrid combinations 
result from the recontextualization of market discourse in universities, shifting 
discourse (discourses, genres, styles) from one context to another. Discourse 
can contingently (subject to circumstances and conditions) be operationalized: 
enacted in ways of (inter)acting, inculcated in ways of being, materialised in e.g. the 
forms of buildings. It is because changes in discourse can mutate and general-
ize into wider social changes in these ways that they are such a significant part 
of social change. This is a matter of the dialectical relations between discourse 
and other social elements, which I return to below. Operationalization can be 
intra-semiotic: discourses can be enacted as genres or inculcated as styles. All 
the italicized terms in this paragraph are concepts and categories in this second 
version (Fairclough 2012). 
The third version focuses upon critique of political debate as an element of 
struggles over strategies to overcome the 2007+ crisis. The focus is upon deliberation 
(practical argumentation) about what should be done because that is the primary 
genre of political discourse, requiring an ‘argumentative turn’ that incorporates ar-
gumentation theory into CDA. Concerns in earlier versions (eg ideology) do not 
disappear, they are now addressed in terms of arguments and their elements (prem-
ises, conclusions). Action (genre) is seen as the primary aspect of discourse, and 
representation and identity (discourses, styles) are addressed as aspects of actions 
rather than in isolation. Critical social analysis needs the focus upon practical argu-
mentation to go beyond just claiming that discourse may have constructive effects 
on social reality, to showing howit can do so: discourses provide reasons for/against 
acting in certain ways. Discourses may have constructive effects where practical 
arguments which include these reasons stand up to critical evaluation and lead to 




















CDA as dialectical reasoning 
CDA is analysis of discourse, but it is also itself a form of discourse. In Fair-
clough (2013) I suggested that it is a form of practical argumentation: argumenta-
tion from a set of premises to a claim about what should be done. According to 
Fairclough & Fairclough (2012), the premises in practical argumentation are: a Cir-
cumstantial premise which represents an existing state of affairs, a Goal premise 
which specifies an alternative state of affairs as goal on the basis of a Value premise 
(the values and concerns one is arguing from), and a Means-Goal premise which 
claims that the advocated line of action in the conclusion of the argument (Claim) 
is a means of achieving the goal. The values and goals in CDA follow from its criti-
cal aims, including for instance the value of social justice and the goal of a just 
society. Practical argumentation moves from problems to solutions: the Circum-
stantial premise doesn’t just represent an existing state of affairs, it ‘problematizes’ 
(Fairclough 2013) it, diagnoses what the problem is, what needs changing, while the 
Goal premise and the Claim advocate a solution, what change to aim for (the goal) 
and what action to take to achieve it (the Claim). 
CDA is more specifically ‘dialectical reasoning’, a form of practical argu-
mentation which gives prominence to the connection between critique, explana-
tion and action. We can characterize it as four steps:
1. Normative critique of discourse.
2. Explanation of normatively criticized discourse in terms of features of 
the existing state of affairs (existing social reality).
3. Explanatory critique of the existing state of affairs.
4. Advocating action to change the existing state of affairs ‘for the better’.
It can be used for critical analysis of political discourse, e.g. political debates, 
whose main argument type is practical argumentation. So CDA is a form practical 
argumentation which critically analyses, and is in a sense in dialogue with, practi-
cal argumentation in politics. 
The focus of such critical analysis is upon discourse as a part of political 
activity types, such as political problem-solving, seeking political solutions to prob-
lems like the funding of education. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle character-
izes politics as action in pursuit of the highest good, based upon decisions, which 
arise out of deliberation (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). So change in reality 
(achieving the ‘highest good’) requires action, action requires decision, decision 
requires deliberation. We can link this to Levinson’s idea of ‘activity types’ (1992) 



















(especially the functions of) the verbal contributions that can be made towards 
it?’ We can broaden this question to ask how ‘verbal contributions’ (e.g. debates 
or other forms of deliberation) affect the activity they are a part of, as well as how 
they are affected by being part of the structure of that activity. The Aristotelian se-
quence deliberation-decision-action-change is instantiated for instance in political 
problem-solving, and the deliberation in this case includes parliamentary debate, 
which we should analyse as a step in the sequence and in relation to the other steps 
(decision, action, change).
Dialectical reasoning extends earlier accounts of dialectical relations between 
discourse and other social elements (Fairclough 2010) and of the ‘constructive’ 
effects of discourses on the wider social reality. It also offers a distinctive approach 
to ‘problematization’ of existing states of affairs, which involves steps 1-3 above and 
is based upon CDA’s theory of discourse, including the claim above that relations 
between discourse and social entities are both cognitive and causal. On the basis 
of this theory, CDA sees normative critique of discourse as a ‘point of entry’ into 
explanatory social critique, and problematization, of existing social reality. This 
is a contribution of CDA to critical social analysis with august precursors: Aristo-
tle advocated starting from phainomena andendoxa, generally accepted beliefs and 
opinions, what people say; and Marx began his critique of political economy with a 
critique of the discourse of the political economists (Fairclough & Graham 2002). 
The problematization of the existing state of affairs begins with normative 
critique of its discourse, then moves to explanation of what features of the existing 
state of affairs bring about normatively criticized features of discourse, and what 
effects such features can have on the state of affairs. This identifies dialectical rela-
tions between discourse and other social elements: for instance, representation of 
students as consumers can be internalized in their beliefs and behaviour. The next 
step is explanatory critique of the existing state of affairs: for example, marketisa-
tion of universities can be criticized because of what it leads to (its consequences), 
and ‘false analogies’ it rests on (as assumptions) such as that between students and 
consumers. Explanatory critique identifies the problem in (‘problematizes’) the 
existing state of affairs,in this casethe marketisation of universities. This provides 
a normative view of problematization: in political deliberation, problematization 
is often open to critique for lacking this explanatory basis. Because identification 
of the problem is linked to advocacy of a solution, problematization links the ex-
isting state of affairs represented in the Circumstantial premise to the goal (Goal 
premise) and advocated action to achieve it (Claim) which constitute the advocated 
solution. How the existing state of affairs is problematized limits the range of pos-



















The movement from problematization to advocated solution is itself charac-
terized by dialectical relations between discourse and non-discursive social elements. 
The problem (marketisation of universities) is a problem of structures and practices 
not just of discourse, yet any solution would be discursive: an ‘imagined’ state of 
affairs (goal) which the ‘imagined’ action (in the Claim) would be a means of achiev-
ing, to replace the problematized state of affairs (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). But 
this means that, as well as being steps in political problem-solving, action and change 
are imagined in deliberation, and how they are imagined affects what range of actions 
and changes are possible: only actions which are imagined can be decided upon and 
taken, limiting the possibilities for change. In terms of dialectical relations, imag-
ined actions may be realized (operationalized) in real actions, and thereby imagined 
change may be realized in real change. So the discourse (deliberation) is affected by 
its position in political problem-solving, but it also affects the range of possibilities 
in the subsequent steps of decision, action and change, constraining it further or 
enabling it to be widened, through dialectical relations both within the deliberation 
and between the deliberation and the other steps. 
Through an understanding of ‘dialectic’, we can comprehend the relation 
between a form of deliberation and the way it affects and is affected by other steps 
in an activity type (e.g. parliamentary debate in political problem-solving). Dialectic 
is one of three interconnected facets of argumentation recognized since classical 
times: logic, dialectic and rhetoric. Dialectic is the dialogical aspect of argumen-
tation, including the critical questioning of arguments in dialogue. Dialectical 
deliberation is a way of arriving at and settling on ‘imaginaries’ for possible alter-
natives to problematized states of affairs (goals in Goal premises) and for actions 
(means) to achieve them, in a critical dialogical process. Such advocated solutions 
emerge from evaluating different arguments and reasons, weighing them against 
each other, retaining what is good and discarding what is bad. This is an epistemo-
logical process of determining the right thing to do, the right way to change the 
existing state of affairs, and the right way to achieve that. 
Bhaskar (1989, 1993) suggests a general notion of dialectic which dialecti-
cal deliberation is an instance of: ‘any process of conceptual or social conflict, 
interconnection and change, in which the generation, interpenetration and clash 
of oppositions, leading to their transcendence in a fuller or more adequate mode 
of thought or form of life, plays a key role’. Dialectical deliberation is a discursive 
(more specifically, argumentative) process, but the dialectic is not purely discur-
sive. It includes dialectical relations been discourse and other elements of states of 
affairs in which discourse is operationalized, including decision, action and change 
as steps in an activity type. So there is a ‘relational’ dialectic as well as the episte-



















liberation as a step in an activity type also contributes to an ‘ontological’ dialectic 
in which a clash between the existing state of affairs and imagined alternatives can 
lead to a more adequate states of affairs. And it contributes to a ‘practical’ dialec-
tic, in which a clash between existing ways of acting and imagined alternatives can 
lead to better ways of acting. Dialectical deliberation is a learning (epistemological) 
process in which learning about better reasons and arguments is at the same time 
learning about better states of affairs and better actions which might achieve them. 
CDA can be seen as dialogue with the political argumentation which it cri-
tiques, a sort of deliberation that ishowever one-sided because those whose argu-
mentation is challenged don’t usually take part. But CDA also aims to contribute 
to deliberation in political action to change the existing state of affairs ‘for the 
better’. CDA is not itself politics, but its critique and analysis can support politics, 
as critical social analysis in general aims to do. Through dialogue with existing 
practical arguments, CDA formulates its own practical arguments in support of 
action to achieve goals which offer solutions to the problems it diagnoses (its own 
problematizations of existing states of affairs). CDA does not always explicitly ad-
vocate solutions, sometimes it is just ‘negative’ critique of existing states of affairs, 
but possible solutions are usually implicit. Arguably CDA should explicitly link 
diagnosis of problems to identification of solutions, ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ critique. 
Practical argumentation can be critically questioned in three main ways 
(Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). A practical conclusion (Claim) can be questioned 
on the grounds that the consequences of the advocated action would undermine 
essential goals; premises can be questioned in terms of truth or ‘rational accept-
ability’; the argument itself can be questioned on the grounds that the conclusion 
(Claim) does not follow from the premises. The critical questioning of Claims 
and of Circumstantial and Goal premises, like the problematization of the exist-
ing state of affairs discussed above, requires explanation. It is only on the basis 
of explanatory analysis of the existing state of affairs that we can determine what 
consequences are likely to follow from what actions, whether the problematiza-
tion of the state of affairs is adequately supported by explanation, and whether 
the imagined state of affairs (goal) is achievable in the existing state of affairs. 
Consequently, the critique of Claims and Circumstantial and Goal premises is 
explanatory critique, as well as normative critique.
My emphasis on explanation is not new, it has been a feature of my approach 
from the beginning (Fairclough 1989), but the integration of critique, explanation 
and action enabled by the turn to argumentation is new. The argumentative turn 
also has other advantages. It is a response to criticism that CDA merely seeks to 



















By being explicit about its own argumentation, CDA makes it clear that its objec-
tives are critical, explanatory and transformative but not justificatory, and also 
how its argumentation can be critically questioned and challenged, andbe open 
to retrospective evaluation in the light of subsequent events. The most encourag-
ing example in my work was a paper on marketisation of universities published 
22 years ago (Fairclough 1993), whose analysis (problematization) of the state of 
affairs in universities in terms of relations between marketisation and changes in 
discourse,and whose suggested solutions, appear to have been broadly vindicated 
by events. CDA could provide the process of public deliberation with a systematic 
critique of proposals and alternatives. Deliberation in public decision-making has 
a number of stages (see the 8-stage model in chapter 6 of Fairclough & Fairclough 
2012), and CDA could be included at the stage where proposals (eg by government) 
are critically tested, and, if found deficient, assessed against alternatives. Where 
available alternatives are themselves deficient, CDA can produce its own alterna-
tives and arguments in support of them. 
The argumentative turn also helps to avoid a confusion about how CDA 
should be evaluated which can arise from quantitative tendencies in the current 
popularity of corpus linguistics. Numbers may have a very minor supporting role, 
but the quality of CDA is a matter of how well its argumentation and the critique 
and analysis incorporated within it stand up to critical questioning and to the turn 
of events. It may also provide a yardstick against which work which is claimed to 
be CDA can be measured. For example, much work in CDA focuses upon the 
contrast between positive self-representation and negative other-representation, 
the ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction, sometimes focusing narrowly on, for instance, the 
pronoun ‘we’. Such issues of representation are important, but we need to establish 
their importance by integrating our analysis of them into critical and explanatory 
analysis of the social and discursive activity in which they assume importance. 
The Kilburn Manifesto
The Kilburn Manifesto (KM) is a political manifesto for transcending neo-
liberalism (Hall, Massey & Rustin 2015). Why use a manifesto to illustrate CDA 
as dialectical reasoning? Because CDA’s concern is not just with criticizing exist-
ing reality but also with political action to change it, and manifestos arepart of 
political action. KMhas arisen froma body of analysis and debate centred recently 
around the journal Soundings,but extending back to the 1970s crisis and emergence 
of neoliberalism, and including earlier manifestos. Stuart Hall’s Gramscian politi-



















particularly influential. Can CDA, as well as learning from it, help to take further 
KM’s view of neoliberalism and the political struggle against it? Can there be a 
‘give-and-take’ between the critical analysis of CDA and the politics of such politi-
cal groups? I refer to parts of the KM by chapter number, apart from the introduc-
tory Framing Statement. 
Discourse in KM
Hall, Massey & Rustin (Framing Statement: 8) begin by stating that ‘main-
stream political debate does not recognise the depth of the crisis, nor the conse-
quent need for radical rethinking ... We therefore offer this analysis as a contri-
bution to the debate, in the hope that it will help people on the left think more 
about how we can shift the parameters of the debate, from one concerning small 
palliative and restorative measures, to one which opens the way for moving towards 
a new political era and new understandings of what constitutes the good society’. 
Discourse (‘debate’) is at the heart of KM, and the central idea is that a social ‘set-
tlement’ like neoliberalism (or a part of it such as marketised universities) has its 
particular ‘parameters’ or ‘terms of debate’ which must be changed in changing 
the settlement. Changing the terms of debate can produce a form of debate which 
‘opens the way’ to transcending neoliberalism. CDA can use this idea, but it can 
also help to take it further. 
Discourse figures inw two main ways in KM, as ‘debate’ (a form of delibera-
tion) and as ‘vocabularies’ (i.e.‘discourses’ in the sense of particular ways of rep-
resenting aspects of reality). On the one hand there is debate, the forms of argu-
ment that feature within it, and the ‘terms of debate’, including what can/cannot 
be politically debated and how this changes as social settlements change, e.g. from 
social democracy to neoliberalism. On the other hand, there are the vocabularies 
which are predominantly used to describe people and things, world views and the 
theories which underlie them, the various social (political, cultural) effects they 
have, and again how they change as socioeconomic settlements change. There is a 
separate chapter on vocabularies (Chapter 1). They are ‘enacted’ in practices (e.g. 
the ‘freedom of choice’ ascribed to individuals is enacted in the ‘mandatory exer-
cise’ of ‘free choice’ in e.g. choosing your doctor), and both of them ‘embody and 
enforce the ideology of neoliberalism’, affirming that one is ‘above all a consumer, 
functioning in a market’. Such vocabularies affect our identities, our relationships, 
and our world, contribute to forming ideologies and ‘common sense’, and contrib-
ute to placing us in a ‘political straitjacket’ by limiting the options we have. ‘Dis-



















are enjoined to be (‘interpellated as’) ‘consumers’, be they students, patients, pas-
sengers or whatever. The ‘so-called truth underpinning this change in descriptions’ 
is that ‘individual interests are the only reality that matters’ and these are ‘purely 
monetary’, and the ‘theoretical justification’ which lies behind this is ‘the idea of 
a world of independent agents whose choices, made for their own advantage, para-
doxically benefit all’ (Chapter 1: 9-11).
The connection between debate and vocabularies is suggested in: ‘Neolib-
eral ideas set the parameters – provide the “taken-for-granteds” – of public discus-
sion, media debate and popular calculation’ (Framing Statement: 17). This actually 
connects debate with neoliberal ‘ideas’ rather than vocabularies, but since ideas 
appear in the discursive form of vocabularies (discourses), we may take it that it is 
latter that ‘set the parameters’ of debate, which amounts to providing the ‘taken-
for-granteds’, the assumptions. The assumptions in debate depend on, and vary 
with, the discourse (vocabulary). 
Changing the terms of debate
How can CDA as dialectical reasoning add to and help develop KM’s dis-
course-oriented analysis of neoliberalism and its view of political struggle to transcend 
it? What are ‘terms of debate’, and what is involved in changing them, from the per-
spective of this version of CDA, and how is it that a form of debate with the right 
terms, produced by changing the terms of debate, could ‘open the way’ to transcend-
ing neoliberalism, as the Manifesto suggests? What does ‘open the way’ mean?
The terms of a particular debate, such as the political debate in Britain 
about how to overcome the 2007+ crisis, depend upon which discourses are in-
cluded or favoured, as opposed to excluded or disfavoured. For example, was a 
revolutionary political discourse included in this debate, and if sowas it a favoured 
discourse or a disfavoured and marginal one? I would say that it was a marginal 
presence. The selection (inclusion/exclusion) of discourses determines what we 
can take to be other aspects of the terms of debate, including what is assumed or 
taken for granted. For example, the necessity of restoring economic growth in the 
aftermath of the crisis was an assumption associated with the most prominent eco-
nomic discourses, both neoliberal and Keynesian. Other aspects of the terms of 
debate which are discourse-dependent include: how existing states of affairs can be 
problematized, and therefore what range of solutions (goals and actions) are avail-
able; what range of reasons for or against actions are available, and what counts as 



















tory’. Changing the terms of debate is basically changing the range of discourses 
which are included and favoured, butdoing so also changes these other aspects. 
In terms of the ‘educative’ aspect of politics (see below), problematization 
makes a particularly clear connection for political activists between changing the 
terms of debate and opening up possibilities for action and change, because how 
states of affairs are problematized affects the solutions (action and change) that are 
available. Hall, Massey & Rustin (Framing Statement: 21) state that the purpose 
of KM is to develop ‘a political project which transcends the limitations of con-
ventional thinking as to what is “reasonable” to propose or do’. But although KM 
is much concerned with explanation, it does not explicitly connect explanation 
to critique and action, nor to debate, whereas these connections are crucial in 
CDA as dialectical reasoning. The selection (inclusion/exclusion, favouring/dis-
favouring) of discourses delimits the range of both reasons and explanations and 
therefore what counts as ‘reasonable’ and ‘explanatory’, and these are important 
aspects of the terms of debate. For example, both neoliberal and Keynesian eco-
nomic discourses provide reasons in favour of actions which promote economic 
growth, and arguments along these lines count as reasonable in the perspective 
of these discourses (though not in the perspective of Green economic discourses). 
And for many political-economic discourses, explanation in terms of structures is 
an essential condition for debate to count as explanatory. Changing the terms of 
debate with respect to explanation can mean adding it where it is absent, or im-
proving it where it is present. Highlighting ‘reasons’ and ‘causes’, and as I suggest 
below ‘motives’, might give a useful focus to the ‘educative’ political aims of KM. 
How is it, in the perspective of CDA as dialectical reasoning, that a form of 
debate produced by changing the terms of debate could ‘open the way’ to radical 
change, including the transcendence of neoliberalism? It is partly because chang-
ing the possibilities for problematizing the existing state of affairs also changes 
the range of possible solutions, and the alternative states of affairs and action to 
achieve them that can be imagined and advocated, potentially including radical 
change. It is also to do with dialectical relations between discourse and other social 
elements. Explanation of how aspects of the existing state of affairs lead to norma-
tively problematic discourse and how the latter affects the former identifies such 
dialectic relations. 
Debate (a form of deliberation) needs to be analysed as part of the sequence 
deliberation-decision-action-change associated with activity types such as political 
problem-solving, as I argued earlier. Action and change are steps in the sequence, 
but they are also imagined in debate, and how they are imagined affects the range 



















actions may be realized (‘operationalized’) in real actions, and thereby imagined 
change may be realized in real change.Changing the discourses means changing 
the possibilities for imagined action and change, which means also changing the 
possibilities for real action and change. I also suggested how the ‘epistemologi-
cal’ dialectic of debate connects with a ‘relational’ dialectic (dialectical relations 
between discourse and other social elements) and thereby ‘ontological’ and ‘prac-
tical’ dialectics. In this perspective, debate is seen as a necessary part of action to 
bring about change, the terms of debate as affecting (constraining/enabling) the 
possibilities for action and change, and changing the terms of debate as chang-
ing those possibilities, either further constraining them, or enabling them to be 
opened up and extended. But what can these CDA ideas contribute to the politi-
cal aims of KM? They can perhaps help people grasp how existing discourse can 
block social change, how changing the ‘terms of debate’ can open it up, and so how 
important it is to critique and challenge the terms of debate. 
The ‘educative’ function of politics
Hall & O’Shea (KM Chapter 3: 22) formulate a strategy for left politics and 
a view of its ‘educative’ character:
 The left and the Labour Party must take the struggle over common sense se-
riously. Politics, as Gramsci insisted, is always “educative”. We must acknowl-
edge the insecurities which underlie common sense’s confusions and contra-
dictions, and harness the intensity and anger ... Labour must use every policy 
issue as an opportunity, not only to examine the pragmatics, but to highlight 
the underlying principle, slowly building an alternative consensus of “popular 
philosophy”. It must harness to this the already strongly existing sense of un-
fairness and injustice. In other words, it must engage in a two-way learning 
process, leading to what Gramsci called “an organic cohesion in which feeling-
passion becomes understanding”. 
Let us rework this in terms of CDA as dialectical reasoning. The fourth 
sentence (‘Labour must ...’) advocates a way of arguing and deliberating in politi-
cal debate: in its argumentation over policies, the left should argue about goals 
and values (‘highlight the underlying principle’) as well as means to achieve 
goals (‘examine the pragmatics’). It should debate not only with other politi-
cal positions and arguments but also with ‘common sense’ argumentation. It 
should ‘engage in a two-way learning process’ which both transforms the ‘confu-
sions and contradictions’ of common sense and ‘harnesses’ its ‘feeling-passion’, 



















between the two, thereby taking ‘struggle over common sense seriously’ and 
seeking to shift common sense towards a new consensus. Although they do not 
formulate it in this way, what Hall & O’Shea are advocating is a shift in the 
terms of debate,which is at the same time a shift in common sense. The left 
needs to draw upon common sense to do it: to draw upon the ‘passion’ and 
‘sense of unfairness and injustice’ to shift values, but also to convert them into 
‘understanding’ by formulating goals and actions which resonate with them. In 
so doing, the left is also seeking to form political constituencies and political 
subjects, which do not exist ‘ready-made ... they have to actively be constructed’ 
(Chapter 11, 197), as well as political agents to bring about change. 
This takes us in the direction of an issue which I do not have space to 
properly address here: how rhetoric and deliberation are combined in political 
deliberation. It suggests that while rhetoric is, as generally recognized, to do with 
persuading people, it is not just a matter of accommodating to or playing upon 
what they already feel, believe and take for granted. In politics it is, or ought to be, 
engaging critically and constructively with people’s common sense feelings and 
beliefs in working up practical arguments and policies which they can become 
the subjects of and agents for. Rhetoric can have a positive and constructive role 
in political deliberation. 
Drawing upon the ‘feeling-passion’ of common sense, e.g. people not just 
believing and claiming that something is unfair but feeling and being moved by 
the unfairness, is drawing upon values (in Value premises) and how people evalu-
ate things on the basis of them. But ‘values’ as we note in Fairclough & Fairclough 
(2012) is too narrow, ‘concerns’ would be more comprehensive. People argue from 
motives which animate and drive them, including their passions (which may include 
greed and gross self-interest), they argue from their emotions and feelings, not just 
from values arrived at through reasoning; an agent needs to ‘care’ about the real-
ization of a value to turn it into a motive for action. There is a difference between 
acting on the basis of reasons and arguments (and analysis and evidence) and acting 
on the basis of feelings and passions, but they are not simply alternatives: people 
argue and deliberate (i.e. evaluate and respond to others’ arguments) on the basis 
of affective concerns, motives, which shape their interpretation of circumstances 
(and how they ‘problematize’ them) and the goals and actions which they advocate. 
This dialectical view of argument as merging reasons and motives, as well as causes, 
resonates with the Gramscian perspective which informs KM. 
But shouldn’t the left’s attempt to shift the terms of debate also include a 



















well as analytic tool which can be of service to would-be political agents (anyone 
seeking to change reality for the better – politicians, party members, political ac-
tivists, active citizens), as well as to critical social analysts as I suggested earlier. 
It starts from critique of discourse, i.e. from things which are largely discernible 
though not always discerned –problematic features of discourse and arguments. 
It then seeks to explain such features in terms of less discernible (partly ‘underly-
ing’) features of existing reality, thereby extending critique beyond discourse to 
the wider social reality, and identifying what aspects of reality need changing, 
what change is possible, and how it might be achieved, as a basis for a practical 
conclusion about what action to take. Critique of discourse (debate) is an effective 
wedge to open up the wider social reality to analysis/critique and thereby action/
change because the discourse is a part of the wider reality, a step towards action 
and change which imagines and prefigures them as well as representing and ex-
plaining the existing reality. This is not a novel view. As I said earlier, Marx’s 
critical method, drawing upon Aristotle, takes critique of discourse as its point 
of departure. Moreover, seeing and critiquing argumentation not in isolation but 
as the beginning of action is the basis for interpreting its dialectical character in 
a materialist rather than idealist way. 
Politicians and political activists are used to deliberating and debating, 
and identifying and engaging with the arguments of others, but what Hall & 
O’Shea are proposing is an art of political debate which is not easy to achieve 
and requires learning, in formal education or practical politics or ideally a com-
bination of the two. So too does dialectical reasoning. Part of what is involved 
here is changes in schooling (language education) similar to the ‘critical lan-
guage awareness’ advocated within CDA as a part of ‘education for democracy’ 
in the 1990s (Fairclough 2010), as part of the educational conditions for making 
radical social change an option.
Gramsci (1995: 297-303) argues that dialectic is a ‘new way of thinking, 
a new philosophy’, but also ‘a new technique’ which he calls ‘the technique 
of thought’, which will ‘provide people with criteria’ to ‘carry out checks and 
make judgements’ and ‘correct distortions in common sense ways of think-
ing’. It is ‘as important to teach this technique as it is to teach reading and 
writing’. Dialectical reasoning provides a technique of thought and a way of 
arguing and deliberating which can identify, explain, critique and open the 
way to changing the terms of debate, itself as part of a way of acting to change 
existing reality. It is I think consistent with the Gramscian perspective of KM 



















which meshes with Hall & O’Shea’s view of the struggle over common sense. 
It is perhaps a way for CDA to contribute to political action to change exist-
ing reality for the better. 
What would people need to know about dialectical reasoning? These are 
essential elements. 
1. How to recognize an argument. Arguments are often partly implicit, and 
need to be reconstructed from texts, i.e. formulated in an explicit way. 
2. How to identify what type of argument it is. 
3. How to identify the premises and conclusion of an argument, including 
which discourses are drawn upon and what reasons are given. 
4. How to evaluate (critically question) a practical argument: its Claim, in 
terms of its likely consequences; its premises, including values, goals and 
the representation/problematization of circumstances; and the inference 
from premises to conclusion. 
5. How to identify an explanation and its constituent parts (explanans and 
explanandum), and how to evaluate it.
6. How to identify reasons, motives and causes, and the connections 
between them. 
7. How to evaluate and critique argumentation as the first step in the 
sequence: deliberation-decision-action-change. 
8. How to develop counter-arguments. 
9. How to identify the ‘terms of debate’and their limitations, how to approach 
changing the terms of debate. 
Conclusion
I have envisaged people in CDA opening a dialogue with those involved in 
political action. Often the same person does both, so the dialogue might be in part 
between different sides of oneself. Working in a transdisciplinary way with col-
leagues in Sociology or Politics departments can also be seen as opening a dialogue, 
but the dialogue with politics seems less transient and more a matter of what we do 
anyway. The perspective of political action should be consistently brought into what 
we do, and we need more reflection on the connections and the differences between 
analytical (critical-explanatory) concerns and political concerns. CDA and politics 
are different but connected, and it is important to insist upon both the connection 
and the difference to avoid confusion. In terms of the Aristotelian sequence, CDA 
contributes to deliberation (as does politics), but decision and action are not part 



















deliberation enables and constrains decision, action and change, and how they can 
be opened up by changing the terms of debate. 
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